The Simple Economics of Funded and Unfunded Pension Systems by Blake, D.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Blake, D. ORCID: 0000-0002-2453-2090 (1998). The Simple Economics of 
Funded and Unfunded Pension Systems (PI-9802). London, UK: Pensions Institute. 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/24408/
Link to published version: PI-9802
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
The Simple Economics of Funded and
Unfunded Pension Systems
David Blake and J. Michael Orszag
Department of Economics
Birkbeck College, University of London,
7-15 Gresse St., London, W1P 2LL, U.K.
January, 1998
Most state pension schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis which
means that taxes on the young are used to pay for the pensions of the retired gen-
eration. With private pensions, however, a fund of assets is built up and invested.
Some countries such as Chile and Australia have moved to a mandatory funded pen-
sion system and the Conservatives in the U.K. have proposed to do the same with
their Basic Pension Plus proposal. Other countries such as the U.S. and Sweden
have built up a funded reserve to help ease the payment of pensions when the ‘baby
boom’ generation retires. This article reviews the economic theories of funded and
unfunded pension systems and examines the advantages and disadvantages of each
type of system; these theories help to explain the current interest in funded systems
as well as the difficulties associated with the transition towards them.
A diagrammatic illustration of why individuals choose to join pension schemes
when they have the appropriate tax incentives is shown in Fig. (1), which repre-
sents an individual’s choice between consumption and savings over the life cycle
expressed in two periods: ‘young’ (i.e., in work) and ‘old’ (i.e., in retirement).
The horizontal axis shows consumption when young and the vertical axis repre-
sents consumption when old. The worker earns a wage W when young and nothing
when old, but can reallocate consumption between youth and old age along his/her
intertemporal budget constraint (WF) (whose slope is determined by the after-tax
return on direct savings). With the availability of savings through a tax-favoured
pension scheme, the worker earns a higher return by putting money into the pension
scheme rather than into direct savings, so a higher intertemporal budget set is avail-
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Figure 1: The effects of pensions on savings.
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able: the broken line (WG). Preferences are captured by the indifference curves U
P
and U
0
which express tradeoffs workers are willing to make and be equally well off.
Prior to the introduction of the pension scheme, the welfare-maximising life-time
consumption bundle is C
0
when young and P
0
when old. With the additional tax ad-
vantages, the worker chooses to save more (CW rather than C
0
W ) and enjoy higher
retirement consumption than otherwise (P rather than P
0
).
Companies in Britain also have tax incentives to make contributions to occu-
pational pension schemes and these date from shortly after World War I, but the
incentives started to become particularly strong as a result of the high taxation of
corporate profits after World War II and subsequent changes in tax rules such as
those in the Finance Acts of 1956 and 1970.1. The result has been a steady increase
in the ratio of private pension wealth to total wealth in the UK (which, in addi-
tion to private pension wealth, comprises housing assets, net financial assets and the
value of Basic State and SERPS (State Earnings Related Pension Scheme) pension
wealth) as shown in Fig. (2).2. Currently, the assets of private pension funds amount
to three-quarters of the size of the gross domestic product of the UK.
While Fig. (1) illustrates the effects of tax incentives for funded pension sav-
ings, it does not describe why governments might prefer unfunded pension systems
to funded systems. However, a slightly different diagram can illustrate this point. In
Fig. (3), we show the difference between fully funded and unfunded pension sys-
tems. The consumption possibilities when young and old under the funded system
are illustrated by the line (WG), as in Fig. (1). With an unfunded system, however,
the tradeoffs between consumption and savings are different. Assuming a constant
tax rate, the payoff to the old depends on the growth rates in population and in
wages. If the payroll (social security) tax is  , the total pension received by the old
is wN , where N is the number of the young and w is the wage of the young. If the
population grows at the rate n, the number of young N will equal (1+n)N
0
, where
N
0
is the number of the old (who were young when they paid their taxes). Similarly,
if real wages and labour productivity grow at the rate g, the wage w of the young
will be (1 + g)w
0
, where w
0
was the wage of the old when they were working. The
return from an unfunded (social security) pension then is determined by the ratio
of the pension received by the old from the young to the taxes paid when the old
themselves were young. This ratio is (1+n)(1+ g) and is equal to one plus the real
growth rate in national income. An unfunded scheme is sustainable in the long run
if the real growth rate in national income is at least as great as the real growth in the
1Blake (1995)
2Blake and Orszag (1996)
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Figure 2: Ratio of private pension wealth to total wealth.
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Figure 3: Funded vs. unfunded pension systems.
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pensions bill (which in turn is equal to the growth rate in per capita real pensions
plus the growth rate in the pensioner population).
We can illustrate this by means of a simple analogy. Imagine there are five
‘workers’ on top of a hill with a well of water and with a stream running down the
hill and at the bottom of the hill are five ‘pensioners’. The five workers at the top
have five buckets and the five pensioners at the bottom also have five buckets. Now
as long as the workers at the top keep drawing water from the well and keep pouring
it down the hill, there will be enough water (i.e., ‘pensions’) to fill the buckets of the
pensioners at the bottom. But what happens if you double the number or pensioners
at the bottom of the hill? Will the scheme still work? Well, the scheme will still
work if the pensioners are now prepared to accept half a bucket of water each. The
scheme will also still work if the workers at the top either work twice as hard in
drawing water as before or if they are given buckets twice as big as their existing
buckets and then they only need to put in the same amount of effort as before.
In terms of our analogy, the growth rate in real pensions is about the amount of
water in the buckets of the pensioners at the bottom of the hill. The growth rate in
labour productivity is about how hard the workers have to work at the top of the
hill and how willing they are to pay (through additional social security payments)
for the growing pension bill of the elderly. And labour productivity also depends
on capital per worker (i.e., the size of the buckets that each worker has), and this,
in turn, depends on investment per worker. With an unfunded scheme, pensioners,
collectively, can never have larger pensions than the next generation of workers
is prepared to give them. But if pensioners are prepared to accept a reduction in
their pensions (i.e., less water in their buckets), then an unfunded system could still
survive the demographic timebomb.
An unfunded scheme will be superior to a funded scheme if (1 + n)(1 + g) is
higher than one plus the tax-subsidised real rate of return on financial assets invested
in a pension fund. This comparison between real income growth and real returns is
known as the Aaron test.3 Fig. (3) illustrates the case when the payoff is higher for
an unfunded system. Individuals’ budget sets are given by the line (WS) (which has
slope  (1 + n)(1 + g)) and they choose to consume C 0 when young and P 0 when
old. In this case, individuals in the unfunded system are able to consume more when
both young and old than under the funded system. However, if the real return on
pension fund assets exceeds n+ g then the funded system will be preferred.
Again, it is possible but somewhat more difficult to illustrate this using the ab-
stract analogy of the stream running down the hill. In this context, we can think
3Aaron (1966)
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of a pension fund as a dam built half way down the hill. The workers still pour
water down the hill, but it is no longer immediately available for the pensioners at
the bottom to fill their buckets. Instead, the water accumulates in a reservoir behind
the dam. Over time, the amount of water in the reservoir rises as rain falls (this
corresponds to the investment return on the assets).
Table (1) summarises the application of the Aaron test to some major countries.
The table shows that unfunded pension schemes are not viable in any major coun-
try if real pensions grow in line with the real growth rate in labour productivity.
However, they are viable in the long run if the real growth rate in pensions is zero
(as it is in the U.K. state pension system); but this implies that, as a proportion of
national average earnings, the state pension will fall continuously over time. In ad-
dition, because the table shows that (except for Japan) the real return on pension
assets exceeds the sum of the forecast growth rates in the labour force and in labour
productivity, funded schemes are generally expected to yield higher returns than
unfunded schemes. One important reason for the superiority of funded schemes is
that pension funds are able to generate high returns by investing in faster-growing
emerging markets.4
An additional layer of complexity, identified first by the Nobel laureate economist
Paul Samuelson,5 arises when we take into account the effort of individuals. For ex-
ample, if the young know they will face high taxes in the future, they may choose
not to work hard or build up valuable skills. Consider, for example, the situation
where one generation accumulates a fund of assets for its retirement. Its consump-
tion during retirement depends on the ‘value’ of the fund at retirement. The fund
can only be used to purchase goods and services that are produced by the next gen-
eration. No generation can store for its own retirement the commodities that it has
produced itself. Each generation is wholly dependent on the next generation, not
only for the types of goods and services that it consumes in retirement, but also for
the quantities of goods and services that it is able to consume. This is because the
next generation also chooses the prices of those goods and services; and it is possi-
ble for the next generation to reduce the ‘value’ of the pension funds of the previous
generation through inflation, for example.
The point that is being made (and this is the crux of Samuelson’s argument) is
4A related problem here is the ‘transition deficit’ which needs to be financed when moving from
an unfunded to a funded system. In Chile, the government issued ‘transition bonds’ in the early
1980s to finance its transition to a funded system. In terms of the analogy presented above, water ac-
cumulates behind the dam and is no longer immediately available to fill existing pensioners’ buckets.
They need to get their water from elsewhere.
5Samuelson (1958)
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Country Growth Rate in: Real Return Unfunded Pension Viable if: Funded Pension Viable if:
Labour Labour Retired on Pension Pensions Grow Real Pension Pensions Grow Real Pension
Force Prod’vity Population Assets with Prod’vity? Growth Zero? with Prod’vity? Growth Zero?
UK 0.0 2.1 0.7 6.3 No Yes Yes Yes
Germany -0.7 2.5 0.8 5.5 No Yes Yes Yes
Netherlands -0.3 2.1 1.2 4.3 No Yes Yes Yes
Sweden 0.1 1.8 0.6 2.8 No Yes Yes Yes
Denmark -0.3 1.9 0.5 5.8 No Yes Yes Yes
Switzerland -0.2 1.5 1.1 2.2 No Yes Yes Yes
USA 0.4 1.6 1.4 3.9 No Yes Yes Yes
Canada 0.4 2.6 1.7 4.1 No Yes Yes Yes
Japan -0.6 4.1 1.4 2.9 No Yes No Yes
Australia 0.5 1.8 1.9 4.2 No Yes Yes Yes
Notes:
1. Projected annual average growth rate in labour force aged 15 to 64 between 1990 and 2050.
2. Annual average growth rate in real GDP per capita between 1967 and 1990, assumed to hold over the period 1990-2050.
3. Annual average real return on pension assets between 1967 and 1990, assumed to hold over the period 1990-2050.
4. Projected annual average growth rate in retired population over the age of 65 between 1990 and 2050.
5. Unfunded pension schemes are viable if the sum of the growth rates in the labour force and in labour productivity exceeds
the sum of the growth rates in the retired population and in real pensions.
6. Funded pension schemes are viable if the real return on pension assets exceeds the growth rate in real pensions.
7. Funded schemes are superior to unfunded schemes if the real return on pension assets exceeds the sum of the growth rates
in the labour force and in labour productivity.
Sources:Penn World Tables, Davis (1995) (Table 6.15), United Nations (1995)
Table 1: Testing the Viability of the Pension Systems in Different Countries in the Next Century
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that, despite having extracted ‘guarantees’ about indexed pensions, it is impossible
for the generation in retirement to assure the real value of its pension in retirement
because it is impossible for that generation to pre-commit the next generation to
deliver a particular flow of goods and services. Since pensioners are interested in
the flow of goods and services in retirement, they will be interested in the flow of
real purchasing power required to pay for these goods and services. This is the case
whether the pension scheme is ‘funded’ or ‘unfunded’. In this sense, all pensions are
PAYG and a pension fund is in reality only a deferred PAYG scheme. Instead of us-
ing current contributions to pay for pensions, a funded scheme pays for pensions us-
ing contributions collected forty years before. This means that even funded schemes
are not immune from the consequences of the demographic timebomb. Neverthe-
less, the claims of pensioners over future flows of goods and services are undeniably
stronger in the case of funded schemes compared with unfunded schemes, especially
if the Aaron test is passed.
A related issue concerns whether it matters where the contributions into funded
schemes are invested. To illustrate, if investment returns are higher abroad, then
investing pension contributions in foreign economies will increase the gross income
available to pensioners compared with investing in the domestic economy. But will
it increase their net (i.e. post-tax) income in retirement? The answer to this question
depends on how flexible the domestic labour market is. If there is a net outflow
of investment funds from the domestic economy, this will eventually reduce capital
per worker and hence labour productivity. If workers respond by accepting lower
real wages, then they will still be able to retain their jobs and compete in the world
market. If they refuse to accept real wage cuts, many are likely to lose their jobs
and this will increase unemployment benefits. Pensioners’ gross incomes may well
increase as a result of overseas investment, but their net income will only be higher
if the taxes needed to pay for these additional unemployment benefits rise by less.
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